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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jacob Farrell appeals from his conviction for trafficking in heroin. He challenges
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Farrell with possession of methamphetamine. (R., p. 94.) Farrell
moved to suppress “all evidence relating to the warrant-less [sic] seizure of the defendant”
in a traffic stop because the “warrantless seizure of the defendant was without reasonable
articulable suspicion.” (R., p. 107.) Farrell argued that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion of a window tinting violation because he “never checked the window to see if
the tinting was installed on the vehicle when new, by the manufacturer/dealer” which
constitutes “an exception to a window tint violation.” (R., p. 111.) Because, Farrell
asserted, the window was “installed by the manufacturer” there was no violation of the
window tinting statute. (Id.)
The state responded, arguing that because the window both appeared and was in
fact darker than allowed by the statute, there was reasonable suspicion for the stop on that
basis. (R., pp. 125-27. 1) Moreover, even if the window were legal because it was original

1

The prosecution also argued that the stop, in addition to being based on a suspected
window tint violation, was “based on the reasonable suspicion that Farrell was transporting
as large amount of narcotics.” (R., pp. 122-24.) Specifically, a narcotics detective had
reliable information that Farrell and his passenger and girlfriend, Katie Seubert, were
driving back from picking up a large amount of heroin. (R., pp. 122-24, 127-29.) For
reasons that do not appear in the record, the prosecution abandoned that argument at the
hearing. (R., p. 117.)
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equipment, such did not mean that the suspicion was unreasonable because that mistake of
fact was a reasonable one. (R., p. 127.)
The district court found that the officer stopped Farrell because he believed the
window tint was darker than allowed by law, an observation he confirmed by using a tint
meter. (R., pp. 150-51.) During the course of the encounter, the two people in the car both
claimed the tint was original to the car. (R, p. 151.) While one officer filled out the citation
for the suspected tint violation, another officer deployed a drug dog, which alerted on the
car. (R., p. 151.) A search then revealed methamphetamine and paraphernalia. (Id.) An
affidavit submitted in relation to the motion “establish[ed] that the window tint on the
vehicle was placed there at the factory, and [was] thus a feature of the vehicle when it was
sold as new.” (R., pp. 138-43, 154.)
The court concluded that the officer “had reasonable and articulable suspicion to
stop the vehicle based on his observation that the back window tint appeared dark.” (R.,
p. 154.) The officer then investigated his suspicions by using a tint meter, which confirmed
that the window was tinted darker than allowed by statute. (R., p. 154.) Although
“evidence … regarding the factory installation of the tint establishes that there was not a
basis for the driver to be found guilty,” that “evidence does not negate the officer’s
reasonable, articulable suspicion.” (Id.)
The state amended the charge to trafficking in heroin and Farrell entered a
conditional guilty plea. (R., pp. 161-69.) Farrell timely appealed from the entry of
judgment. (R., pp. 174-80.)

2

ISSUE
Farrell states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Farrell’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Farrell failed to show that the district court erred when it concluded that
evidence that Farrell was not guilty of the window tint violation did not demonstrate a lack
of reasonable suspicion?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Concluded That Evidence Tending To Show That Farrell
Was Not Guilty Of The Window Tint Violation Did Not Show A Lack Of Reasonable
Suspicion
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that, although evidence submitted at the hearing

showed that the window tint was installed at the factory and therefore Farrell was
ultimately not guilty of the window tint infraction, such did not “negate” the reasonable
suspicion that the windows were darker than allowed by the Idaho Code. (R., p. 154.) On
appeal Farrell contends the district court erred because the evidence showed the officer
“did not complete the stop expeditiously.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) Farrell has failed to
show error because his request for the Court to second-guess the investigative method
employed by the officer is contrary to law. Review of the record shows that the officer
reasonably investigated whether the rear window violated I.C. § 49-944(1) and concluded
it did. The record also shows that a further investigation, regarding whether I.C. § 49944(5) applied and there was no tint violation because the window had been installed when
the car was purchased new, would have only extended, not shortened, the traffic stop.

B.

Standard Of Review
“When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial

court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Mullins, 164 Idaho
493, 432 P.3d 42, 45 (2018) (internal citations omitted).
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C.

Farrell’s Request For The Court To Second-Guess The Investigative Method
Employed By The Officer Is Contrary To Law
“[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500
(1983). “In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an
investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). The officer’s diligence is not subject to a “post hoc
evaluation” for “some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have
been accomplished.” Id. at 686–87. “The question is not simply whether some other
alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize
or to pursue it.” Id. at 687 (emphasis added). See
also State
Buti,
- --- - -v.
-- - 131 Idaho 793, 79697, 964 P.3d 660, 663-64 (1998) (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686-87).
Idaho code states that it is unlawful to operate a car with rear window tinting that
does not have light transmission of 35% or more. I.C. § 49-944(1), (2). There is no dispute
that the car in question had a rear window with tinting that had light transmission less than
35%. (R., p. 151.) However, Idaho code also provides that it is not a violation to operate
a motor vehicle with an overly tinted window “with which the motor vehicle was sold when
new.” I.C. § 49-944(5).
The district court concluded that “the registered owner of the vehicle, Scott Farrell,
submitted an affidavit which establishes that the window tint on the vehicle was placed
there at the factory, and [was] thus a feature of the vehicle when it was sold as new.” (R.,
p. 154 (citing Affidavit of Scott Farrell).) The Affidavit of Scott Farrell states he is the
5

owner of the car in question, that the window tinting “is factory,” and that the VIN of the
car and documentation from the Chevrolet dealership confirms this. (R., pp. 138-43.)
Initially, there was nothing unreasonable with the officer investigating whether the
window complied with I.C. § 49-944(1). Using the light meter was a reasonable way to
make this determination, and had the meter shown 35% or better light transmission, the
investigation would have been complete. Moreover, nothing in this record (or the generally
accepted concept of time) indicates that the officer extended the stop by not conducting a
further investigation of whether the window complied with I.C. § 49-944(5). The record
shows that compliance under I.C. § 49-944(5) was ultimately shown by documentation
from the dealership.

It is plain that undertaking an investigation to obtain such

documentation would have extended the stop. The district court properly concluded that
reasonable suspicion was not negated because Farrell was able to muster dealer
documentation not readily available to the officer showing that the overly dark rear window
was original equipment.
On appeal Farrell argues that evidence of a marking on a car window, submitted by
his counsel, shows that the officer should have immediately, or with a quick inspection of
the marking, recognized that the windows were installed at the factory. (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 9-10. 2) However, no evidence in this record establishes that the marking on a window
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Farrell’s appellate counsel repeatedly claims there was a marking “in the rear window”
showing that the windows were factory installed. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 3, 9-10.) This
matches the argument made below (R., p. 112), but Farrell presented no evidence of the
marking’s location other than to say it was on “Defendant’s car window” (R., p. 119).
Nevertheless, for purposes of argument the state will assume that the marking was on the
rear window.
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actually demonstrates anything about whether the rear window was installed when the car
was sold when new.
Below, Farrell argued the marking stated “Tempered G, DOT — 476 AS-3 M-AT
014, TRANS. 20%.” (R., p. 111.) Nothing in this marking shows that the window was
original equipment on the car. To the contrary, Farrell argued to the district court that the
“parts list and VIN confirm the window was installed on all vehicles of this make and
model by the factory.” (Id.) The evidence thus does not indicate, much less establish, that
the markings on the window were enough to know if the window was installed in the
factory or later.

To the contrary, the evidence shows that the markings alone are

insufficient to make this determination; it was the VIN and parts list that yielded the result
that the window falls within the scope of I.C. § 49-944(5). (R., p. 154 (district court’s
finding of compliance with I.C. § 49-944(5) based on the Affidavit of Scott Farrell, which
did not include anything about window markings).) Farrell’s argument on appeal that the
officer should have been able to ascertain from the window markings that which was shown
by the dealer documentation has no support in the record.
The officer had reasonable suspicion that the rear window did not comply with I.C.
§ 49-944(1), and therefore the car was being driven in violation of I.C. § 49-944(1), (2).
Using the tint meter to confirm that the window did not comply with I.C. § 49-944(1) was
a reasonable investigation. Upon confirming that the window did not comply with I.C. §
49-944(1) it was reasonable to continue the traffic mission by writing the citation. That
Farrell was later able to show that the car fell within the exception provided by I.C. § 49944(5) by providing documentation from the dealership did not demonstrate the officer
delayed the stop by unreasonably failing to recognize or pursue an investigation into
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whether the window was factory installed. To the contrary, even if Farrell were correct,
and the officer should have investigated by obtaining documentation from the dealer, he
has not shown that pursuing that course would have in any way shortened his investigative
detention. To the contrary, pursuing such an investigation could only have lengthened the
detention. Farrell has therefore failed to show error on the record.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 6th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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